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THE WTO AND THE ANTI-CORRUPTION MOVEMENT
Padideh Ala'it
This article explores the role of the World Trade Organization ("WTO") in
promoting "good governance"' while placing the WTO within the larger frame-
work of the ongoing global anti-corruption movement.2 Governmental policies
aimed at fighting corruption are part of the "good governance" criteria set forth
by the World Bank and other donor agencies. 3 An important element of good
governance is transparency, 4 which has also been one of the pillars of the multi-
lateral trading system. 5 This article argues that from the perspective of the post-
Cold War international anti-corruption movement, 6 the WTO is an important in-
t Professor of Law, Washington College of Law, American University. The author thanks Lisa
Kohl, Meghan Kloth, Navid Sato and Paulo Palugod for their assistance in preparing this article.
I World Bank, Governance and Anti-Corruption, http://go.worldbank.org/EBMU3VAOZO (last vis-
ited Sept. 17, 2008). The term "governance" generally means "traditions and institutions by which au-
thority in a country is exercised for the common good." This definition includes:
(i) the process by which those in authority are selected, monitored and replaced, (ii) the capacity
of the government to effectively manage its resources and implement sound policies, and (iii)
the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic and social interac-
tions among them.
Id. For the purpose of this article, the term "governance" means the "process of decision-making and the
process by which decisions are implemented (or not implemented)." United Nations Economic and So-
cial Commission for Asia and the Pacific, What is Good Governance?, http://www.unescap.org/pdd/prs/
ProjectActivities/Ongoing/gg/govemance.asp (last visited Sept. 16, 2008). According to the United Na-
tions, "good governance" is governance that allows for wide participation and that is: consensus-orien-
tated, accountable, transparent, responsive, effective, efficient, equitable, inclusive and follows the rule of
law. Id. These characteristics are related and interdependent and each merit detailed study and analysis
that is well beyond the scope of this article.
2 For a description of the anti-corruption movement, see infra Section II; see also Padideh Ala'i, The
Legacy of Geographical Morality and Colonialism: A Historical Assessment of the Current Crusade
Against Corruption, 33 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 877 (Oct. 2000) [hereinafter Ala'i, Geographical Moral-
ity] (tracing the history of the anti-corruption movement from the time of the East India Company to the
present and describing the current anti-corruption movement and its distinguishing features from earlier
transnational anti-corruption efforts).
3 See World Bank, Governance Matters 2008, http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp
(last visited Sept. 24, 2008) (listing control of corruption as one of the World Wide Governance Indica-
tors (WGI) along with: voice and accountability, political stability and absence of violence, government
effectiveness, regulatory quality and rule of law).
4 See WILLIAM MOCK, ON THE CENTRALITY OF INFORMATION LAW: A RATIONAL CHOICE Discus-
SION OF INFORMATION LAW AND TRANSPARENCY, 17 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 1069, 1082
(1999) (defining transparency as "sharing information or acting in an open manner," or as "a measure of
the degree of which information about official activity is made available to an interested party").
5 See Padideh Ala'i, The Multilateral Trading System and Transparency, in TRENDS IN WORLD
TRADE: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF SYLVIA OSTRY 105-32 (Alan S. Alexandroff ed., 2007) [hereinafter Ala'i,
Multilateral Trading System and Transparency]; see also Sylvia Ostry, China and the WTO: The Trans-
parency Issue, 3 UCLA J. INT'L L & FOREIGN App. 1 (1998) [hereinafter China and the WTO]; Hudson
N. Janisch, Administrative Process and the Rule of Law, in CHINA AND THE LONG MARCH TO GLOBAL
TRADE: THE ACCESSION OF CHINA TO THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 192-93 (Ostry et al. eds.,
2002) (arguing that China will need to move from relationship-based trading towards a transparent rules-
based system before it may be fully integrated in international trade).
6 See Alai, Geographical Morality, supra note 2, for history and development of the post Cold-War
anti-corruption movement.
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stitution because it provides a comparatively successful forum for the expression
and development of good governance values such as transparency.
Since the creation of the WTO in 1995 the transparency provisions of the
WTO Agreements have become increasingly important and central to its man-
date.7 An example of this trend is the increase in the use of Article X of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT") 1994 in the context of WTO
dispute settlement and the reaction of the panels and the Appellate Body to such
increased use.8 Starting in 1997, the transparency and due process obligations
contained in Article X of GATT 1994 have emerged from obscurity and been
applauded as embodying fundamental principles of transparency and due pro-
cess. 9 The increased visibility of the WTO's good governance mandate occurs at
a time when the anti-corruption movement is losing steam. After more than a
decade, reports indicate that direct efforts at combating corruption in the public
sector by the World Bank have been largely unsuccessful, particularly in the
context of the poorest countries. 10 In addition, efforts to prosecute bribe payers
in the developed world are faltering. 1 The WTO contributes to the anti-corrup-
tion movement by providing a forum where the problems associated with lack of
transparency and due process in administration or implementation of measures
(such as rules, judicial decisions or administrative rulings) are acknowledged and
countries may negotiate for detailed transparency-enhancing criteria in specific
areas of trade regulation.
This article is divided into three parts. The first part begins with an assess-
ment of the WTO's role in promoting transparency and good governance since its
creation in 1995. This analysis will review the scope and prevalence of the trans-
parency related provisions and review the jurisprudence of Article X of GATT
1994 as developed by panels and the WTO Appellate Body. The second part will
review the post-cold war anti-corruption movement and assess the movement's
impact since its emergence in 1996. Finally, the WTO's transparency-related ac-
tivities will be placed within the larger anti-corruption movement and contrasted
7 See, e.g., Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867
U.N.T.S 154, 33 I.L.M. 1144 (1994) [hereinafter WTO Agreement].
8 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1867 U.N.T.S. 187, 33 I.L.M. 1153 (1994) [hereinafter GATT
1994 or GATT].
9 See Appellate Body Report, United States-Restrictions on Imports of Cotton and Man-Made Fibre
Underwear, 20, WT/DS24/AB/R [hereinafter Appellate Body Report, US - Underwear]; Panel Report,
United States-Restrictions on Imports of Cotton and Man-Made Fibre Underwear, TT 7.64-.69, WT/
DS24/R [hereinafter Panel Report, US -Underwear].
10 See WORLD BANK, PUBLIC SECTOR REFORM: WHAT WORKS AND WHY? 58-61 (2008), http://site
resources.worldbank.org/EXTPUBSECREF/Resources/psr-eval.pdf [hereinafter IEG Report] (examin-
ing Bank support for public sector reform from 1999-2006); see also discussion infra Section I for
detailed explanation on LEG Report.
I I See Fritz Heimann & Gillian Dell, Progress Report 2008: Enforcement of the OECD Convention
on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions 8 (2008), http://
www.transparency-usa.org/documents/OECD2008ProgressReport.pdf [hereinafter OECD Report] (show-
ing that there has been no significant improvement in combating corruption since the adoption of the
OECD convention).
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with the direct approach to the corruption problem undertaken by the World
Bank and other multilateral institutions.
I. WTO's Transparency and Good Governance Mandate
A. The Scope of the Transparency Provisions of the WTO
The rise of the regulatory or administrative state in the last half of the twenti-
eth century forced the multilateral trading system to focus on the proliferation of
non-tariff barriers ("NTBs") as a result of increased regulation. The text of the
Uruguay Round Agreements reflects the reality of a regulatory state by empha-
sizing the importance of transparency and administrative due process in diverse
areas such as trade in services,12 trade-related aspects of intellectual property
rights, 13 sanitary and phytosanitary measures, 14 and technical regulation. 15
These provisions and many others reflect the increased "legalization" of the mul-
tilateral trading system and the evolution of the trading system from GATT 1947.
Compared to that system, which was exclusively based on reciprocal bargaining
and exchange of concessions, the WTO system increasingly focuses on the pro-
cess of rule-making and administration of rules by Members.
The oldest good governance and transparency obligation of the WTO is con-
tained in Article X of GATT 1994. The language of Article X was not changed
with the creation of the WTO and remains unchanged from what was initially
proposed by the United States State Department in 1946 as Article 15 of the
suggested Charter of the International Trade Organization ("ITO"). 16 Subse-
quently, the language was adopted as Article X of GATT 1947.17 The language
of Article X was influenced by the U.S. Administrative Procedures Act ("APA"),
12 General Agreement on Trade in Services, Annex IB of the WTO Agreement, supra note 7 [herein-
after GATS]. Specifically, Article III of GATS (Transparency) largely follows the language of Article X
and requires publication of all relevant measures including international agreements affecting trade in
services. Id. art. 111(1). In addition, Article III requires that WTO members annually inform the WTO
Council for Trade in Services of any changes made to the laws that affect trade in services and the
commitments that each member has made on that agreement. Id. art. 111(3). It also requires all members
to "establish one or more enquiry point to provide specific information to other members." Id. art. 111(4).
GATS Article VI (Domestic Regulation) requires members to maintain "judicial, arbitral or administra-
tive tribunals" to review administrative decisions affecting trade in services. Id. art VI(2)(a).
13 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Annex IC of the WTO
Agreement, supra note 7 [hereinafter TRIPS]. Article 63 of TRIPS (Transparency) requires publication
of all intellectual property related measures and notification to the WTO Council for TRIPS. Id. art.
63.1. In addition, Article 63.3 allows W'TO members to object to another member's specific judicial and
administrative rulings in the area of intellectual property and to request detailed written justification for
the ruling. Id. art 63.3.
14 Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Annex LA of the WTO
Agreement, supra note 7 [hereinafter SPS Agreement].
15 Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Annex 1A of the WTO Agreement, supra note 7 [here-
inafter TBT Agreement].
16 Sylvia Ostry, Convergence and Sovereignty: Policy Scope for Compromise?, in COPING WITH
GLOBALIZATION 52, 67 (Aseem Prakash & Jeffrey A. Hart eds., 2000) (noting that there is no significant
difference between GAT'I Article X and the initial State Department drafting).
17 See Ostry, supra note 5, at 3; see also General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. X, Oct. 30,
1947, 61 Stat. A-1, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT 1947].
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which was enacted in 1946.18 Article X:I requires that "all laws, regulations,
judicial rulings, and administrative rulings of general application" (collectively
"Measures") be "published promptly in such manner as to enable governments
and traders to become acquainted with them." 19 Article X:2 prohibits enforce-
ment of measures prior to publication. 20 Article X:3 requires all measures be
administered in a "uniform, impartial and reasonable manner" 21 and compels
Members to establish tribunals or procedures for review of the administrative
actions relating to customs matters. 22
In 1947, not a single GATT contracting party expressed an interest in Article
X or objected to its inclusion. In fact, a senior Canadian negotiator of the time
was quoted as stating that Article X contained no additional substantive require-
ments and should therefore not be of any concern. 23 Throughout the GATT years
(1947-1995) there were other agreements that contained transparency-related
provisions but they were not binding on all contracting parties and remained
largely silent obligations. 24 During the Uruguay Round, these previously negoti-
ated agreements, such as the Anti-Dumping Code, significantly enhanced the
transparency and due process provisions. 25 Under GATT 1947, Article X was
18 See 1 WTO, GATT, ANALYTICAL INDEX: GUIDE TO GATT LAW AND PRACTICE 309 (Updated 6th
ed. 1995) (noting that Article X was also "partially based on Articles 4 and 6 of the 1923 International
Convention Relating to the Simplification of Customs Formalities"); see also Ala'i, Multilateral Trading
System and Transparency, supra note 5, at 105, 108-12 (discussing the history and evolution of the APA
and its relationship with Article X of GATT 1947).
19 GATr, supra note 8, art. X:I ("Laws, regulations, judicial decisions and administrative rulings of
general application ... pertaining to the classification or the valuation of products for customs purposes,
or to rates of duty, taxes or other charges, or to requirements, restrictions or prohibitions on imports or
exports, or on the transfer or payments therefore, or affecting their sale, distribution, transportation... or
other use shall be published promptly in such manner as to enable governments and traders to become
acquainted with them. Agreements affecting international trade policy . . . shall also be published."
(emphasis added)).
20 Id. art. X:2 ("No measure of general application ... effecting an advance in a rate of duty . . or
imposing a new or more burdensome requirement, restriction or prohibition on imports . . . shall be
enforced before such measure has been officially published." (emphasis added)).
21 Id. art. X:3(a) ("Each [Member] shall administer in a uniform, impartial and reasonable manner
all its law, regulations, decisions and rulings of the kind described in paragraph I" (emphasis added)).
22 Id. art. X:3(b) ("Each [Member] shall maintain, or institute as soon as practicable, judicial, arbitral
or administrative tribunals or procedures for the purpose . . of the prompt review and correction of
administrative action relating to custom matters. Such tribunals or procedures shall be independent of the
agencies entrusted with administrative enforcement." (emphasis added)).
23 Sylvia Ostry, Article X and the Concept of Transparency in the GATT/WTO, in CHINA AND THE
LONG MARCH TO GLOBAL TRADE: THE ACCESSION OF CHINA TO THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION,
supra note 5, at 123 [hereinafter Ostry, Article X and Transparency]; see also China and the WTO, supra
note 5, at 4.
24 Furthermore, the GATT did not have a formalized dispute settlement mechanism and operated
under the consensus system that did not allow for many disputes. See JOHN H. JACKSON ET AL., LEGAL
PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 214-46 (5th ed. 2008), for a discussion of the
GATT system.
25 The Tokyo Round Anti-dumping Code, Agreement on the Implementation of Article VI of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, GATT" B.I.S.D. (26th Supp.) (1980) [hereinafter Anti-Dumping
Code], did not have many of the transparency and due process requirements contained in the Anti-
Dumping Agreement in Annex IA of the WTO Charter, Agreement on the Implementation of Article VI
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Annex IA of the WTO Agreement, supra note 7
[hereinafter Antidumping Agreement]. The Antidumping Agreement specifically contained additional
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almost never invoked, and when it was raised by the contracting parties before a
GATT panel, it was usually dismissed as subsidiary. 26
There are many provisions dispersed throughout the WTO agreements that
impose transparency-related obligations. In the context of trade in goods, Article
X of GATT 1994 was made applicable to the Agreement on Implementation of
Article VII of the GAT'F, 27 Agreement on Rules of Origin,28 and Agreement on
Safeguards.29 The other Annex LA Agreements do not specifically reference Ar-
ticle X of GATT 1994, but they do contain extensive transparency and due pro-
cess provisions. These agreements include the Agreement on Application of
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures ("SPS Agreement"), 30 Agreement on Tech-
nical Barriers to Trade ("TBT Agreement"), 31 Agreement on Implementation of
Article VI of the GAT ("Anti-dumping Agreement"), 32 Agreement on Subsidies
and Countervailing Measures ("SCM Agreement"), 33 and Agreement on Import
Licensing Procedures ("Licensing Agreement"). 34 Generally, many of the Annex
IA Agreements state that in order for rules to be WTO-consistent they must be
administered in a manner that is transparent and not unduly restrictive of trade.
Many WTO agreements also contain detailed transparency-enhancing notifica-
tion requirements where Members are required to notify the WTO about changes
in rules or adoption of new ones.
The requirements of Article X of GATT 1947 are replicated throughout the
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). 35 Article III of GATS (Transparency)
replicates the language of Article X of GATT 1994 and makes it applicable to
provisions on duration and review of anti-dumping duties, id. art. 11, public notice, id. art. 12, as well as
judicial and administrative review, id. art. 13.
26 See Padideh Ala'i, From the Periphery to the Center? The Evolving WTO Jurisprudence on
Transparency and Good Governance, II J. INT'L ECON. L. 779, 779 (2008) [hereinafter Ala'i, From the
Periphery to the Center] (discussing the evolution of Article X and its transparency related obligations
from relative obscurity before the WTO into a provision of 'fundamental importance' under the WTO, as
evidenced by the increased number of cases asserting Article X claims before WTO panels and the
appellate body).
27 Agreement on Implementation of Article VII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994,
Annex IA of the WTO Agreement, supra note 7, art. 12 [hereinafter Agreement on Customs Valuation]
("Laws, regulations, judicial decisions and administrative rulings of general application giving effect to
this Agreement shall be published in conformity with Article X of GATT 1994").
28 Agreement on Rules of Origin, Annex IA of the WTO Agreement, supra note 7, pmbl. ("Recog-
nizing that it is desirable to provide transparency of laws, regulations, and practices regarding rules of
origin").
29 Agreement on Safeguards, Annex IA of the WTO Agreement, supra note 7, art. 3.
30 SPS Agreement, supra note 14, Annex B.
31 TBT Agreement, supra note 15.
32 Antidumping Agreement, supra note 25, art. 12.
33 Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Annex IA of the WTO Agreement, supra
note 7, art. 22 [hereinafter SCM Agreement].
34 Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures, Annex IA of the WTO Agreement, supra note 7,
pmbl. [hereinafter Licensing Agreement] (Convinced that import licensing, particularly non-automatic
import licensing, should be implemented in a transparent and predictable manner ... Desiring to sim-
plify, and bring transparency to, the administrative procedures and practices used in international trade
.. .. .).
35 GATS, supra note 12.
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trade in services. It requires publication of all relevant measures including all
international agreements affecting trade in services. 36 In addition, Article III re-
quires that WTO members annually inform the WTO Council on Trade in Ser-
vices about any changes made to the laws that affect trade in services and the
commitments that each member has made on that agreement. 37 Article III of
GATS also requires WTO members to "establish one or more enquiry points to
provide specific information to other members. ' 38 Article VI of GATS regarding
domestic regulation requires members to maintain "judicial, arbitral or adminis-
trative tribunals" to review administrative decisions affecting trade in services. 39
Similarly, the TRIPS Agreement has extensive transparency requirements in-
cluding Article 63, which requires publication of all intellectual property mea-
sures and notification to the WTO Council for TRIPS. 40 In addition, Article 63.3
of TRIPS allows WTO members to object to another member's judicial and ad-
ministrative rulings in the area of intellectual property and to request detailed
written justification for the ruling. 41
The Trade Policy Review Mechanism ("TPRM") 42 of the WTO is a trans-
parency related mechanism that dates back to the Montreal Ministerial Meeting
in December 1988 when the Negotiating Group on the Functioning of the GATT
System ("FOGS") introduced the TPRM into the agenda of the Uruguay
Round.43 The TPRM was intended to improve adherence to the agreed policies
and practices of the GATT through greater transparency in domestic implementa-
tion.44 The TPRM was explicitly not designed to enforce GATT obligations or
dispute settlement procedures. 45 On January 1, 1995, the TPRM became Annex
3 to the WTO Charter with the mandate to perform periodic reviews of the trade
policies and practices of all Members. The TPRM objective is to increase adher-
ence by Members to the WTO rules, disciplines and commitments "by achieving
greater transparency in, and understanding of, the trade policies and practices of
Members."'46 Specifically, the TPRM examines the impact of a Member's trade
policies and practices on the multilateral trading system. 47 In the TPRM Part B
the Members recognize the important role that the mechanism can play in pro-
moting "domestic transparency." The relevant language in the TPRM provides:
36 Id. art. II:1.
37 Id. art. 111:3.
38 Id. art. 111:4.
39 Id. art. VI:2(a).
40 TRIPS, supra note 13, art. 63.
41 Id. art. 63.3.
42 Trade Policy Review Mechanism, Annex 3 of the WTO Agreement, supra note 7 [hereinafter
TPRM].
43 Negotiating Group on Functioning of the GATT System, Note by the Secretariat: Meeting of 24-
28 October 1988, 91 8, MTN.GNG/NGI4/10 (Nov. 14, 1988).
44 TPRM, supra note 42, IN A, B.
45 Id. 9 A(i).
46 Id. (emphasis added).
47 Id. I A(ii).
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Members recognize the inherent value of domestic transparency of gov-
ernment decision-making on trade policy matters for both Members'
economies and the multilateral-trading system, and agree to encourage
and promote greater transparency within their own systems, acknowledg-
ing that the implementation of domestic transparency must be on a volun-
tary basis and take account of each Member's legal and political
systems .48
The voluntary language was included because the TPRM under the WTO is
"not intended to serve as a basis for the enforcement of specific obligations under
the Agreements or for dispute settlement procedures, or to impose new policy
commitments on Members. '49 Subsequent internal appraisal of the operation of
the TPRM have concluded that "[g]reater attention should be given to trans-
parency in government decision making in trade policy matters" 50 and that the
TPRM "had demonstrated that it had a valuable public-good aspect, particularly
in its contribution to transparency ' 51 and that it had at times "been a catalyst for
Members to reconsider their policies, had served as an input into policy formula-
tion and had helped identify technical assistant needs."' 52 Clearly, there is much
more that the TPRM can do to enhance domestic transparency. Such progress is
likely to positively impact areas beyond decision making, and particularly in the
area of trade given the ever-expansive scope of measures that are considered to
be related to trade.
The transparency obligations of the WTO may extend beyond the text of nego-
tiations from the Uruguay Round as additional transparency and good govern-
ance provisions are found in Protocols of Accession to the WTO.53 The most
noteworthy example is the accession protocol of the People's Republic of China.
Examples of China's transparency obligations include: (1) a commitment to en-
force only those laws, regulations and other measures that pertain to or affect
trade in goods, services, intellectual property and foreign exchange that are pub-
48 Id. B.
49 Id. B.
50 WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, ANALYTICAL INDEX: GUIDE TO WTO LAW AND PRACTICE, Vol. II,
1388 (Cambridge University Press, 2nd ed. 2007) (citing World Trade Organization, Appraisal of the
Operation of the Trade Policy Review Mechanism, 3, WT/MIN(99)/2 (1999) [hereinafter Appraisal of
the Operation of TPRM]).
51 Id. (citing Appraisal of the Operation of TPRM, supra note 50, 1 4).
52 Id.
53 The results of the accession negotiations are:
[A]I1 brought together in a draft Protocol setting out the terms on which the applicant is to be
invited to accede. The [Accession] Protocol is annexed to the Report of the Working Party. The
Working Party also annexes a draft Decision for the General Council inviting the applicant to
accede on the terms set out in the draft Protocol. The General Council/Ministerial Conference
adopts Working Party Reports in accordance with the relevant WTO decision-making proce-
dures. When they adopt the Decision, WTO Members offer terms of accession to the acceding
state. When it accepts the Protocol, by signature or otherwise, the acceding state also accepts
those terms and becomes a Member of the WTO thirty days after notifying acceptance of the
Protocol.
Handbook on Accession to the WTO: Introduction and Summary from the WTO's Accessions Div.
(2007), http://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/acce/cbt-coursee/introe.htm.
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lished and readily available to other WTO Members, individuals or enterprises; 54
(2) an obligation to establish or designate an official journal for publication of all
such laws and to provide appropriate authorities with a "reasonable period of
time for comment" before such measures are implemented; 55 (3) a commitment
that the official journal will be regularly published with copies readily availa-
ble;56 (4) a commitment to establish or designate enquiry points where, upon
request, any individual, enterprise or WTO Member shall obtain copies of mea-
sures affecting trade; 57 and (5) an agreement to set up some sort of mechanism
whereby individuals, enterprises and other WTO Members can request informa-
tion and get reliable and accurate information from the Chinese government
within a timely manner. 58
As a result of the transparency provisions enumerated above and other good
governance commitments of Members, thousands of laws and regulations have
been implemented across the globe and institutions have been set up to make
Members comply with such obligations. 59 The WTO website seems to promote
this view when it states that the WTO commitments promote "good
government. 6
0
B. The DSM and Good Governance
Throughout the history of GATT (1947-1994), there are only nine adopted
GATT 1947 panel decisions involving Article X of GATT 1947. To one extent or
54 World Trade Organization, Accession of the People's Republic of China, pt. 1, sec. 2(C), para. 1,
WT/L/432 (Nov. 23, 2001) [hereinafter Accession Protocol of the People's Republic of China].
55 Id. pt. 1, sec. 2(C), para. 2.
56 Id.
57 Id. pt. 1, sec. 2(C), para. 3.
58 Id.
59 As per its requirements in the Accession Protocol, China established the MOFCOM Gazette pub-
lished by the Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China ("MOFCOM") to publicize all
trade-related laws, regulations, and rules. Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China,
http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/index.shtml. This website is the only official enquiry point noted in the
WTO Transitional Review of China in 2007 whereby the public may comment, review comments from
other members of the public, and view the government's responses. Accession Protocol of the People's
Republic of China, supra note 54, pt. 1, sec. 2(C), para. 3; see also World Trade Organization, Council
for Trade in Goods, Report of the Council for Trade in Goods on China's Transitional Review, 7.34, G/
L/844 (Dec. 7, 2007). The WTO Trade Policy Review Body on China listed several other enquiry points
in their earlier 2006 review, which do not appear in the 2007 transitional review, one of which was the
General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine ("AQSIQ") to monitor the
inspection process of cargo imported to China. Trade Policy Review Body, Report by the Secretariat,
People's Republic of China, Revision 38, WT/TPR/S/I 61 (June 26, 2006). Pursuant to agreement in the
2008 Strategic Economic Dialogue (SED) talks between the United States and China, the Information
Centre Legislative Affairs Office of the State Council P.R. of China, would "publish in advance for
public comment, subject to specified exceptions, all trade and economic-related administrative regula-
tions and departmental rules that are proposed for adoption."; U.S.-China Economic Dialogue Ends on
Successful Note, June 19, 2008, http://www.america.gov/st/texttransenglish/2008/June/20080619150342
xjsnommis0.7032129.html.; see. e.g., Foreign Trade Law of the People's Republic of China, July 1,
2004, http://english.mofcom.gov.cnlaarticle/policyrelease/internationalpolicy/200703/20070304473373.
html (example of publication of trade and economic-related regulation).
60 World Trade Organization, The 10 Benefits of the WTO System, http://www.wto.org/english/
thewto_e/whatis e/lOben_elOblO_e.htm (last visited Sept. 17, 2008).
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another, the United States has been involved in all of them.61 The first mention
of Article X of GATT 1947 within the context of a trade dispute was in 1984.
The initial cases involving transparency claims were all filed by the United States
against Japan. 62 These cases generally reflected the frustration of the United
States with what it deemed to be an opaque and secretive system of administra-
tive guidance used by the Japanese government to implement policy in the trade
area and to influence actions of private Japanese traders as well as to encourage
consumer preferences for domestic products. In all of these cases, the reference
to issues of transparency and administration of laws (such as prompt and ade-
quate publication) were viewed by the GATT panels as a subsidiary obligation to
the more substantive provisions of the GATT, such as the market access provi-
sions of Articles II and XI: 1 and the non-discrimination principles of Article I
and III. In many cases, the issue of whether or not a measure was administered
in a manner inconsistent with the requirements of Article X was dismissed with-
out discussion.63 Instead it ruled that once a measure is substantively a trade
barrier, its manner of administration was irrelevant. 64 The approach of GATT
panel reports towards any type of regulation that could serve as a NTB was to
find a measure inconsistent with the GATT whenever it operated as a trade bar-
rier. This perspective is moderated under the WTO Agreements where certain
types of regulations, such as certain health and safety regulations, are allowed
notwithstanding their ability to act as a NTB.
The WTO panels and the Appellate Body are increasingly aware of the legiti-
mate role of regulation even if it does interfere with trade. The focus has shifted
to balancing the needs of free trade against the legitimate non-trade goals of
61 The United States has been involved in the following GATT Panel Reports: GATT Panel Report,
United States - Countervailing Duties on Non-Rubber Footwear from Brazil, SCM/94 (Oct. 4, 1989);
Canada-Import, Distribution and Sale of Certain Alcoholic Drinks by Provincial Marketing Agencies,
DS17/R (Oct. 16, 1991) [hereinafter GATT Panel Report, Canada - Provincial Liquor Boards (US)];
European Economic Community - Regulation on Imports of Parts and Components, L/6657 (Mar. 20,
1990); Canada - Import Restrictions on Ice Cream and Yoghurt, L/6568 (Sept. 27, 1989) [hereinafter
GATT Panel Report, Canada - Ice Cream and Yoghurt]; European Economic Community - Restrictions
on Imports of Apples - Complaint by the United States, L6513 (June 9, 1989); European Economic
Community - Restrictions on Imports of Dessert Apples - Complaint by Chile, L/6491 (Apr. 18, 1989);
Republic of Korea - Restrictions on Imports of Beef- Complaint by the United States, L/6503 (May 24,
1989) [hereinafter GATT Panel Report, Korea - Beef (US)]; Japan - Trade in Semi-Conductors, L/6309
(Mar. 24, 1988) [hereinafter GATT Panel Report, Japan - Semi-Conductors]; Japan - Restrictions on
Imports of Certain Agricultural Products, LU6253 (Nov. 18, 1987) [hereinafter GATT Panel Report,
Japan - Agricultural Products 1]; Panel on Japanese Measures on Imports of Leather, L5623 (Mar. 2,
1984) [hereinafter GATT Panel Report, Japan - Leather II (US)]. The United States was involved in all
of these cases: six as complainant, one as respondent, and two as interested third party. Out of the seven
cases initiated by the United States, three were against Japan. See GATT Panel Report, Japan - Semi-
Conductors, supra; GATT Panel Report, Japan - Agricultural Products I, supra; GATT Panel Report,
Japan - Leather II (US), supra. Two were against Canada. GATT Panel Report, Canada - Provincial
Liquor Boards (US), supra; GATT Panel Report, Canada - Ice Cream and Yoghurt, supra. One was
against Korea. GATT Panel Report, Korea - Beef (US), supra.
62 See GATT Panel Report, Japan - Semi-Conductors, supra note 61; GATT Panel Report, Japan -
Agricultural Products I, supra note 61; GATT Panel Report, Japan - Leather H (US), supra note 61.
63 See, e.g., GATT Panel Report, Japan - Leather If (US), supra note 61, 57 (stating that "the Panel
found that it was not necessary for it to make a finding on these [subsidiary] matters," referring to Article
X arguments of the Untied States).
64 Ala'i, From the Periphery to the Center, supra note 26, at 784-87.
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regulation. As a result, there has been increased focus on transparency in admin-
istration of rules and ensuring that rules are applied in an open, predictable, and
even-handed manner.
Since the creation of the WTO in 1995, there has been a minimum of twenty
cases addressing Article X of GATT 1994 claims. 65 A wide variety of countries
at different levels of economic development have invoked Article X of GATT
1994, including: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Gua-
temala, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Korea, Mexico, Thailand, Turkey and the
United States. This diversity demonstrates in turn the growing consensus among
Members that the expectations for market access and non-discrimination goals of
65 Panel Report, United States - Measures Relating to Shrimp from Thailand, WT/DS343/R (Feb. 29,
2008); Panel Report, United States - Customs Bond Directive for Merchandise Subject to Anti-Dumping!
Countervailing Duties (US - Customs Bond Directive), WT/DS345 /R (Feb. 29, 2008); Appellate Body
Report, United States - Customs Bond Directive for Merchandise Subject to Anti-Dumping/Counter-
vailing Duties (US - Customs Bond Directive), WT/DS345/AB/R (Jul. 16, 2008); Panel Report, Turkey -
Measures Affecting the Importation of Rice, WT/DS334/R (Sept. 21, 2007); Appellate Body Report,
European Communities - Selected Customs Matters, WT/DS315/AB/R (Nov. 13, 2006) [hereinafter Ap-
pellate Body Report, EC - Selected Customs Matters]; Panel Report, European Communities - Selected
Customs Matters, WT/DS315/R (June 16, 2006) [hereinafter Panel Report, EC - Selected Customs Mat-
ters]; Appellate Body Report, Mexico - Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and Other Beverages, WT/DS308/
AB/R (Mar. 6, 2006); Panel Report, Mexico - Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and Other Beverages, WT/
DS308/R (Oct. 7, 2005); Appellate Body Report, Dominican Republic - Measures Affecting the Importa-
tion and Internal Sale of Cigarettes, WT/DS302/AB/R (Apr. 25, 2005); Panel Report, Dominican Repub-
lic - Measures Affecting the Importation and Internal Sale of Cigarettes, WT/DS302/R (Nov. 26, 2004)
[hereinafter Panel Report, Dominican Republic - Import and Sale of Cigarettes]; Appellate Body Report,
United States - Sunset Reviews of Anti-Dumping Measures on Oil Country Tubular Goods from Argen-
tina, WT/DS268/AB/R (Nov. 29, 2004) [hereinafter Appellate Body Report, US - Oil Country Tubular
Goods Sunset Reviews]; Panel Report, United States - Sunset Reviews of Anti-Dumping Measures on Oil
Country Tubular Goods from Argentina, WT/DS268/R (Nov. 30, 2006); Appellate Body Report, United
States - Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000, WTI/DS234/AB/R (Jan. 16, 2003); Panel
Report, United States - Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000, WT/DS234/R (Sept. 16,
2002); Panel Report, Egypt - Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on Steel Rebar from Turkey, WT/
DS21 /R (Aug. 8, 2002); Appellate Body Report, United States - Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain
Hot-Rolled Steel Products from Japan, WT/DS 184/AB/R (Jul. 24, 2001); Panel Report, United States -
Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled Steel Products from Japan, WT/DS 184/R (Feb. 28.
2001) [hereinafter Panel Report, US - Hot-Rolled Steel]; Panel Report, United States - Anti-Dumping
Measures on Stainless Steel Plate in Coils and Stainless Steel Sheet and Strip from Korea, WT/DS 179/R
(Dec. 22, 2000); Panel Report, Argentina - Measures Affecting the Export of Bovine Hides and the
Import of Finished Leather, WT/DS155/R (Dec. 19, 2000) [hereinafter Panel Report, Argentina - Hides
and Leather]; Panel Report, United States - Anti-Dumping Duty on Dynamic Random Access Memory
Semiconductors (DRAMS) of One Megabit or Above from Korea, WT/DS99/R (Jan. 29, 1999) [hereinaf-
ter Panel Report, US - DRAMS]; Appellate Body Report, Japan - Measures Affecting Agricultural Prod-
ucts, WT/DS76/AB/R (Feb. 22, 1999); Panel Report, Japan - Measures Affecting Agricultural Products,
WT/DS76/R (Oct. 27, 1998); Appellate Body Report, United States - Import Prohibition of Certain
Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 10, 1998) [hereinafter Appellate Body Report, US -
Shrimp]; Panel Report, United States - Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/
DS58/R (May 15, 1998); Appellate Body Report, European Communities - Measures Affecting Importa-
tion of Certain Poultry Products, WT/DS69/AB/R (July 13, 1998); Panel Report, European Communities
- Measures Affecting Importation of Certain Poultry Products, WT/DS69/R (Mar. 12, 1998); Panel Re-
port, Indonesia - Certain Measures Affecting the Automobile Industry, WT/DS54/R, WT/DS55/R, WT/
DS59/R, WT/DS64/R (July 2, 1998); Panel Report, Japan - Measures Affecting Consumer Photographic
Film and Paper, WT/DS44/R (Mar. 31, 1998) [hereinafter Panel Report, Japan - Film]; Panel Report,
European Communities - Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas (EC - Bananas
III (Mexico)); Panel Report, European Communities - Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution
of Bananas, WT/DS27/R/MEX (Sept. 25, 1997); Appellate Body Report, European Communities - Re-
gime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, WT/DS/27/AB/R (Sept. 9, 1997); Appellate
Body Report, US - Underwear, supra note 9; Panel Report, US - Underwear, supra note 9.
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the trading system cannot be met without transparency in administration of
measures.
In contrast to GATT 1947 panels, the WTO panels and the Appellate Body
have held that the provisions of Article X are expressions of values of fundamen-
tal importance, i.e., transparency and fundamental due process. 66 As early as
1997, the WTO Appellate Body stated in United States - Underwear that Article
X "may be seen to embody a principle of fundamental importance... known as
the principle of transparency that has obviously due process dimensions. '67 In
many decisions involving Article X of GATT 1994, the Appellate Body has em-
phasized that Article X is concerned with "expectations of traders" that operate in
the "real world" and that in finding violations of those provisions the Appellate
Body or the panels will take into account the individual trader's perspective.
68
The Appellate Body has stated that the values of due process and transparency
must be paramount when a Member attempts to justify a measure under an ex-
ception to the WTO obligations. 69 In other words, erecting trade barriers or ap-
plying domestic regulations in a way that disfavors foreign interests must be done
in a transparent and even-handed manner.
Appellate Body and other adopted panel reports have expanded the scope of
Article X. Article X: 1 has been interpreted so that the term "measures of general
application" includes both internal measures and border measures. 70 As a result,
the domestic regulatory framework is brought within the scope of the trans-
parency and due process requirements of the WTO. In addition, a panel has held
that "a measure qualifies under Article X: 1 as an administrative ruling of general
application even if it is addressed to only a specific company or shipment so long
as such a ruling establishes or revises principles applicable in future cases.
7 1
The term "uniform" in Article X:3(a) has been interpreted to mean that "custom
laws should not vary, that every exporter and importer should be able to expect
treatment of the same kind, in the same manner over time and in different places
66 See Ala'i, From the Periphery to the Center, supra note 26, at 800 (arguing that the importance of
Article X is evidenced by the member countries' increased willingness to assert Article X claims).
67 See Appellate Body Report, US - Underwear, supra note 9, at 20.
68 See, e.g., Appellate Body Report US - Oil Country Tubular Goods Sunset Reviews, supra note 65,
202-210; see also Panel Report Argentina - Hides and Leather, supra note 65, T 11.77.
69 Appellate Body Report, US - Shrimp, supra note 65, at 182.
70 Article X: 1 of GATT, supra note 8 ("Laws, regulations, judicial decisions and administrative rul-
ings of general application, made effective by any contracting party, pertaining to the classification or the
valuation of products for customs purposes, or to rates of duty, taxes or other charges, or to requirements,
restrictions or prohibitions on imports or exports or on the transfer of payments therefore, or affecting
their sale, distribution, transportation, insurance, warehousing inspection, exhibition, processing, mixing
or other use, shall be published promptly in such a manner as to enable governments and traders to
become acquainted with them. Agreements affecting international trade policy which are in force be-
tween the government or a governmental agency of any contracting party and the government or govern-
mental agency of any other contracting party shall also be published. The provisions of this paragraph
shall not require any contracting party to disclose confidential information which would impede law
enforcement or otherwise be contrary to the public interest or would prejudice the legitimate commercial
interests of particular enterprises, public or private.").
71 Panel Report, Japan - Film, supra note 65, N 10.384-.388.
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and with respect to the other persons. '72 Panels have also held that "access to
information" and "flow of information" are essential to meeting the due process
requirements of Article X:3(a). The WTO panel in Argentina - Hides and
Leather also defined the term "reasonable" as relating to question of information
and access to information. 73 In Dominican Republic - Import and Sale of Ciga-
rettes the WTO panel ruled that the administration of the provision of the Selec-
tive Consumption Tax was "unreasonable" and inconsistent with Article X:3(a)
because it used the "nearest similar product" to determine the tax rate on im-
ported cigarettes while that was not the criteria that had been stated in the regula-
tion.74 The panel also ruled that a survey taken by the Dominican Republic's
Central Bank on average prices of cigarettes that was the basis for the tax should
have been published as an administrative ruling of general application. 75
The applicability of the general transparency requirements of Article X to the
other Agreements of Annex IA is not clear. The WTO panels and Appellate
Body have found that the Article X and the Import Licensing Agreement can
simultaneously apply to a measure. 76 On the other hand, the panels and the Ap-
pellate Body have been reluctant to apply the general language of Article X to the
Anti-dumping Agreement and have instead focused their decisions solely on the
procedural due process requirements of the Anti-dumping Agreement.77 How-
ever, the panel or the Appellate Body's refusal to subject anti-dumping practices
of the United States to the general due process requirements of Article X:3(a) has
not stopped other Members from continuing to bring such claims.78
EC-Selected Customs Matters is the only case to date where the sole legal
basis for the dispute was the due process requirements of Article X:3(a). In that
case, the United States challenged the EEC system of customs administration in
its entirety or "as a whole" for not being administered in a uniform manner as
required under Article X:3(a). 79 The panel in EC-Selected Customs Matters criti-
cized the EEC system of customs administration as particularly "complicated
and, at times, opaque and confusing," but concluded that the "as a whole" claim
72 Panel Report, Argentina - Hides and Leather, supra note 65, 11.83.
73 Id. 11.86.
74 Panel Report, Dominican Republic - Import and Sale of Cigarettes, supra note 65, T 8.3(c).
75 Id. H 7.408, 8.3(d).
76 Ala'i, From the Periphery to the Center, supra note 26, at 796 (discussing the differing approaches
taken by WTO panels and the Appellate Body).
77 See, e.g., Panel Report, US -DRAMS, supra note 65, 1 4.542-.544
78 Id. 4.461 (Korea arguing that "[t]he transparency and uniformity obligations of Article X apply
to the WTO Agreements, including the AD Agreement."); Panel Report, US - Hot-Rolled Steel, supra
note 65, 7.263 ("Japan submits that Article X of GAT'T 1994 goes beyond the elements of due process
established in the AD Agreement and is in essence a comparative provision that ensures that certain
parties are not afforded less due process rights than others.").
79 Panel Report, EC - Selected Customs Matters, supra note 65, 1 4.473 (summarizing that the "Un-
tied States is arguing that the EC's system of customs law administration as a whole does not result in the
uniform administration that Article X:3(a) requires.").
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was outside the scope of the panel's terms of reference and could therefore not be
decided.80
The Appellate Body, on the other hand, held that the EEC's system of customs
administration could be challenged "as a whole or overall" under Article X:3(a)
and that such a claim was within the scope of the panel's term of reference. On
appeal, however, the Appellate Body stated that it did not have enough facts on
the issue to decide the "as a whole" claim. 8' As important is the Appellate Body
language in the report that destroys the substantive/administrative distinction that
had long be used by panels to limit the scope of Article X to only the administra-
tion of a measure. The Appellate Body in EC-Selected Customs Matters held
that the substance of a measure can be challenged so long as it necessarily leads
to lack of uniform, impartial or reasonable administration and in violation of
Article X:3(a). 82 By eroding the administrative-substantive distinction that had
been used to limit the scope of Article X:3 of GATT 1994, the Appellate Body
has not only sanctioned "as a whole" claims but also opened the door to future
cases challenging substance of laws under Article X:3 of GATT 1994.
Expansive interpretations of Article X obligations by the Appellate Body have
not necessarily resulted in finding of Article X violations. In fact, the culture of
the WTO dispute settlement panels and the Appellate Body is to "avoid making
controversial decisions, while incrementally developing the jurisprudence so that
future panels and the Appellate Body can accommodate the expansion of the
[trade] mandate into areas that go beyond GAT's traditional sphere of securing
or promoting trade liberalization, and into promoting good governance" within
Member states. 83 In EC-Selected Customs Matters the Appellate Body did find
that the EC's system of customs administration could have been challenged "as a
whole," but in the end the ultimate finding of inconsistency with Article X of
GATT 1994 requirements was very narrow, concentrating on the actual non-uni-
form administration of customs as it applies to Liquid Crystal Display (LCD)
units.84 It is the modus operandi of the WTO panels and particularly the Appel-
late Body to interpret the provisions of the WTO Agreements broadly so that
80 Id. 7.191. The panel further stated, "[wie can imagine that the difficulties we encountered in our
efforts to understand the EC's system of customs administration would be multiplied for traders in gen-
eral and small traders in particular who are trying to import into the European Communities." Id.
81 Appellate Body Report, EC-Selected Customs Matters, supra note 65, 285 (stating that, "it ap-
pears to us that these general observations of the Panel do not constitute a sufficient foundation of factual
findings or undisputed facts upon which we can rely for completing the analysis.").
82 Id. 201.
83 Ala'i, From the Periphery to the Center, supra note 26, at 800-01; see also Debra P. Steger, The
Culture of the WTO: Why It Needs to Change, 10 J. IT'L ECON. L. 483, 485-86 (2007). As Professor
Steger writes:
The mandate and purpose of the WTO is no longer clear. The mandate of the GATT system was
continuing the process of trade liberalization .... The preamble to the GATT 1947 reflected
these goals. The preamble of the WTO Agreement is broader - it includes the goals of environ-
mental sustainability and development. . .but they have not become part of the accepted theology
or culture of the WTO as perceived by its members. So, there is a difference between what the
preamble of the WTO says the purpose of the organization is and what its members perceive it to
be. Id.
84 Panel Report, EC - Selected Customs Matters, supra note 65, 8.1(b)(v).
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they can maintain great flexibility in interpretation in future cases. At the same
time, however, such broad interpretations are applied in a very conservative fash-
ion, as was done in the case of EC-Selected Customs Matters. This incremental
approach allows the Appellate Body to set the ground work for future decisions
enforcing values of good governance without getting the push back that may
happen when the rhetoric of anti-corruption is used. The incremental approach
of the Appellate Body and panels allows the WTO to continue to require reform
in areas of governance, including enhanced transparency, without undermining
the legitimacy of the multilateral trading system.
II. The Post-Cold War Anti-Corruption Movement (1996-present)
A. The Scope of the Movement
By 1995, a transnational anti-corruption movement was emerging based on the
premise that corruption was a major impediment to the success of market eco-
nomics.85 The movement focused on the detrimental economic (as opposed to
social or moral) effects of corruption in the context of development. The univer-
sal and objective rules of the market led the movement to categorically reject the
cultural relativist approach to corruption. 86 One reason for the growth of interest
in the problem of corruption in the mid-1990s was that economic globalization
and the application of free market reforms had also increased the opportunities
for corruption. 87 The failure of free market reforms to reduce the gap between
the rich North and the poor South was blamed on corruption as developed coun-
try government officials and international financial institutions ("IFIs") 88 blamed
corruption for "sabotaging" market oriented policies and programs that aimed to
reduce poverty.89
85 See generally Ala'i, Geographical Morality, supra note 2.
86 See ROBERT KLITGAARD, CONTROLLING CORRUPTION 64 (1988) (rejecting the notion that corrup-
tion should be geographically relative because, "the majority of people in nearly all cultures understand
that most types of corruption . . . are neither lawful nor customary").
87 See Susan Hawley, The Comer Hourse, Exporting Corruption: Privatisation, Multinationals and
Bribery (2000), available at http://www.thecomerhouse.org.uk/pdf/briefing/19bribe.pdf (arguing that IFIs
are responsible for increases of corruption in developing countries through their own policies, of deregu-
lation, privatization and structural adjustment with civil service reform and economic liberalization); see
also Someshwar Singh, Privitization and 'Reforms' Spread Corruption, THIRD WORLD NETWORK (July
5, 2000), available at http://www.twnside.org.sg/title/corruption.htm (reiterating Hawley's view that IFIs
create opportunities for corruption through their lending policies despite the emphasis on anti-poverty
and good governance).
88 The IFIs include: The World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the regional de-
velopment banks, including, the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the Inter-American Development
Bank (IDB), the African Development Bank (AFDB) and the European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (EBRD) (collectively referred to as the international financial institutions (IFIs)).
89 See Jon Jeter, Rich, Poor Further apart as Earth Summit Nears, WASH. POST, Aug. 25, 2002,
available at http://www.commondreams.org/headlines2/0825-02.htm (citing western government offi-
cials who blame lack of development on corruption and mismanagement).
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The year 1996 marked a stark shift in the approach of the IFIs90 to the problem
of corruption. 91 That year, the IFIs "reinterpreted" corruption as an impediment
to economic and social development. 92 Prior to 1996, corruption was viewed as
a political issue that was outside the economic mandate of the IFIs. The shift in
the rhetoric of corruption from political to economic was not limited to the IFIs,
and, in fact, became a distinguishing feature of the post-Cold War international
anti-corruption movement.93 The reason for this re-packaging of corruption as an
economic issue was that the end of the Cold War led to a global shift to "West-
ern-style" democracy and economic policy and trade had for the first time prior-
ity over military and strategic concerns. 94 Also in 1996, the IMF issued a
declaration entitled "Partnership for Sustainable Growth" which included "pro-
moting good governance in all its aspects" and "tackling of corruption" as essen-
tial components of development. 95 By 2001, combating and controlling
corruption and promoting good governance had become central to the work of
the IFIs.96
90 This section only discusses the activities of the World Bank but other regional development banks
have also had extensive anti-corruption initiatives over the past decade.
91 See SUSAN ROSE-AcKFRMAN, CORRUPTION AND GOVERNMENT: CAUSE, CONSEQUENCES AND RE-
FORM 177 (1999) ("The end of the Cold War has changed the balance of forces and removed any compel-
ling need to support corrupt regimes for national security reasons.").
92 The re-interpretation of corruption as an impediment to economic development was particularly
useful for the IFIs, which are prohibited under their respective Articles of Agreement from taking into
account "non-economic" considerations and from interfering in the "political affairs" of any member. See
James D. Wolfensohn, President of the World Bank, Speech at the Farewell Dinner to Ibrahim F.I.
Shihata: Transcript of Proceedings of the Formal Liber Amicorum Presentation Ceremony (Sept. 2001)
(on file with author) (explaining that corruption could not be mentioned in connection with the bank
because it was political but that by "redefining" and "reinterpreting" corruption to pertain to the economy
and social issues, the Bank could now deal with the issue).
93 See Ala'i, Geographical Morality, supra note 2, at 904-09 (discussing the economic focus of the
current anti-corruption discourse which include an emphasis on empirical data which highlighted the
costs of corruption).
94 See Michael A. Almond & Scott D. Syfert, Beyond Compliance: Corruption, Corporate Responsi-
bility and Ethical Standards in the New Global Economy, 22 N.C. J. INT'L & COM. REG. 389, 399 (1997)
(citing the shift to Western-style democracy and market economies as a cause of the increased priority
placed on international economic policy).
95 Int'l Monetary Fund [IMF], Partnership for Sustainable Global Growth Interim Committee Decla-
ration, at 3 (Sept. 29, 1996), available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/dec.pdf. In 2000, the IMF
issued substantially the same declaration jointly with the World Bank. Compare id., with IMF & World
Bank, An Enhanced Partnership for Sustainable Growth and Poverty Reduction (Sept. 5, 2000), availa-
ble at http://www.imf.org/external/np/omd/2000/part.htm (listing good governance and freedom from
corruption as guiding principles).
96 In addition to the actions taken by the IMF and World Bank to fight corruption, a number of
regional development banks also enacted programs to combat corruption. For example, in 2001 the
Asian Development Bank (ADB) began working with OECD to run the "Anti-Corruption Action Plan for
Asia and the Pacific." ADB/OECD Anti-Corruption Initiative, Anti-Corruption Action Plan for Asia-
Pacific (2001), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/38/24/35021642.pdf. The African Develop-
ment Bank lists both governance and anti-corruption as topics to be addressed by the bank and approved
"Good Governance and Policy Implementation Guidelines" in both 1999 and 2001. Afr. Dev. Bank,
Bank Group Policy on Good Governance (Jul. 1999), available at http://www.afdb.org/pls/portal/url/
ITEM/F56CEEF92AAC6A37EO3OA8CO668C4E3F.pdf; Afr. Dev. Bank, Operational Policy for Bank
Group Policy on Good Governance (Mar. 2001), available at http://www.afdb.org/pls/portal/url/ITEM/
16CC941BA21032D6E040C00AOC3D5D84.pdf.
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Over time, the World Bank's anti-corruption work was subsumed under its
"good governance" agenda as "controlling corruption" and became one of the six
factors the World Bank uses in order to measure a borrowing countries level of
good governance.97 A prominent example of the IFI's early attempt to combat
corruption was the 1997 suspension of $210 million in aid by the IMF to Kenya
due to "poor governance" and excessive corruption. 98 The IMF and the World
Bank conditioned the resumption of aid on the passage of anti-corruption legisla-
tion that, among other things, mandated the creation of the Kenya Anti-Corrup-
tion Authority.99 In 2001, Kenya was required to pass additional governance
legislation and codes of ethics and strengthen the legal status of the Anti-Corrup-
tion Police Unit. It is clear, however, that such suspension of aid did not reduce
corruption. Kenya continues to be ranked as among the most corrupt states in the
world as the IFIs have continued to express concern about the prevalence of
corruption in Kenya.' 00
Early in this century the anti-corruption emphasis of the World Bank became
particularly controversial as World Bank President Paul Wolfowitz withheld
funding to India, Kenya, Chad, Bangladesh, Argentina, and the Congo.' 0 ' By
2006, the World Bank's approach to combating corruption and promoting good
governance was raising concerns that the World Bank was now "pursuing anti-
corruption measures at the expense of delivering essential funds to the poorest
people."' 1 2 The current World Bank President, Robert Zoellick (formerly the
United States senior trade negotiator), has been less aggressive than Wolfowitz in
97 The World Bank Worldwide Governance Research Indicator Reports evaluate six factors: (1)
voice and accountability; (2) political stability and absence of violence; (3) government effectiveness; (4)
regulatory quality; (5) rule of law; and (6) control of corruption. See Daniel Kaufmann et al., Govern-
ance Matters VIP Aggregate and Individual Governance Indicators, 1996-2007 (World Bank, Policy
Research Working Paper No. 4654, 2008), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-
id=1 148386. In addition, the World Bank formed the "World Bank Governance Group" to develop pro-
grams promoting good governance and to oversee their implementation.
98 See Thomas Omestad, Bye-Bye to Bribes: The Industrial World Takes Aim at Official Corruption,
US NEWS & WORLD REP., Dec. 22, 1997.
99 See Letter of Intent by the Gov't of Kenya to the IMF and the attached Memorandum of Econ. &
Fin. Policies of the Gov't of Kenya, 2000-03 (July 10, 2000), http://www.imf.org/external/nploi/2000/
ken/01/index.htm; IMF Sets Tough New Conditions for Aid Deal, DAILY NATION (Kenya), Aug. 2, 2000
(highlighting the requirements of the IMF, including enacting an anti-corruption and economic crimes
bill).
100 See TRANSPARENCY INT'L, CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX 2008, http://www.transparency.org/
content/download/36589/575262 [hereinafter CPI 2008] (ranking Kenya as the 147th most corrupt coun-
try out of 180 countries).
101 See Sebastian Mallaby, Wolfowitz's Corruption Agenda, WASH. POST, Feb. 2, 2006, at A21 (pro-
viding examples of Wolfowitz's approach to corruption, such as the withholding of millions of dollars for
health projects to India).
102 See Angela Balakrishnan, Poor Countries Suffering From Aid Chaos, GutARDAN (London), Sept.
22, 2006, at 30 (expressing the United Nations Conference of Trade and Development's concerns about
Wolfowitz's approach); see also Steven R. Weisman, World Bank's New Chief Will Also Focus on Cor-
ruption, INT'L HERALD TRm., June 25, 2007 (stating that while Wolfowitz was accused of prioritizing
corruption over poverty, the new President intends to continue with the anti-corruption agenda, but not at
the expense of the poorest people in the poorest countries).
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cutting funds for countries as part of its anti-corruption initiatives but maintains
that he is still pressing ahead with an anti-corruption agenda.10 3
Other significant legal accomplishments of the post Cold War anti-corruption
movement have included the ratification of the Inter-American Convention
Against Corruption (OAS Convention) (1996), 104 the Organization for Economic
Development Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in
International Business Transactions (OECD Convention) (1997),, 05 and the
United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UN Anti-Corruption Conven-
tion) (2003).106 In addition, in 1998 the Council of Europe established the Group
of States against Corruption (GRECO) 10 7 and adopted three legal instruments;
Criminal Law Convention on Corruption, 108 Civil Law Convention on Corrup-
tion, 109 and Recommendation on Codes of Conduct of Public Officials. " 10
Governments, international civil society, business groups and corporations
(non-state actors) have also joined the anti-corruption bandwagon. The most sig-
nificant player has been Transparency International (TI). TI was established in
1993 and has been instrumental in creating the anti-corruption movement. TI's
founders were former World Bank employees who had seen the detrimental im-
pact of corruption on economic development. TI proceeded to build a global
coalition to combat corruption at both national and international levels and its
primary focus has been to mobilize people and expertise behind anti-corruption
initiatives at country levels and to interface between governments, businesses and
civil society for effective governance."' TI's most influential publication is its
103 Weisman, supra note 102; see also Bretton Woods Project, Zoellick and Corruption: A New Ap-
proach?, Feb. 1, 2008, http://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/art-559952 (describing that Zoellick has a
different approach than his predecessor in fighting corruption).
104 Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, Mar. 29, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 724 [hereinafter OAS
Convention].
105 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development Convention on Combating Bribery of
Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, Dec. 17, 1997, 37 I.L.M. I [hereinafter
OECD Convention].
106 United Nations Convention Against Corruption, G.A. Res. 58/4, U.N. Doc. A/58/422 (Oct. 31,
2003).
107 See Agreement Establishing The Group of States Against Corruption-GRECO, Comm. of Minis-
ters, 102nd Sess., Res. (98) 7 (May 6, 1998), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/
E2198.htm. GRECO was initially established by 17 states and has since grown to include 46 states.
GRECO functions as a monitoring mechanism that aims to improve the capacity of its members to fight
corruption by following up on their activities through a process of mutual evaluation and peer pressure.
108 Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention on Corruption, Jan. 27, 1999, Europ. T.S. No. 173,
Jan. 27, 1999, 38 I.L.M. 505, available at http://www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/afd/int-ref-ef/coe-crim-lcc/default.
asp?content id=5490.
109 Council of Europe Civil Law Convention on Corruption, E.T.S. No. 174, Nov. 4, 1999, available
at http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/en/treaties/htmlU174.htm.
110 Council of Europe, Recommendation No. R (2000) 10 of the Comm. of Ministers to Member States
on Codes of Conduct for Public Officials, 106th Sess. (May 11, 2000), available at www.coe.int/t/dgl/
greco/documents/Rec(2000) 10_-EN.pdf.
I See TRANSPARENCY INTr'L, About Transparency International, http://www.transparency.org/about-
us (last visited Sept. 24, 2008).
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Annual Corruption Perception Index (CPI).' 2 A low CPI ranking can potentially
affect both foreign aid and foreign investment in a developing country. 13 An-
other example is the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), a world busi-
ness organization with national associations in more than 130 countries which
has been an active participant in the anti-corruption movement. The ICC focuses
on "extortion" of bribes by "foreign public officials" and advocates the inclusion
of corruption on the list of non-tariff barriers that are prohibited by WTO rules.
The ICC Commission on Anti-Corruption has issued a number of advisory docu-
ments and most recently published "The Business Case Against Corruption." 4
B. The Progress Report of the Anti-Corruption Movement
In 2008, the IEG Report was issued reviewing the World Bank activities in the
area of Public Sector Reform (PSR) over the past decade. As part of that review,
the World Bank Independent Evaluation Group (lEG) also looked at the Bank's
anti-corruption activities which have been a component of PSR.I" 5 The IEG Re-
port states that since 1999 the World Bank has explicitly identified Anti-Corrup-
tion and Transparency (ACT) reform as part of its PSR programs.' 16 It also
states that from the late 1990s until 2006 the ACT component of World Bank
PSR programs increased from 9% of the total project cost to 38% of total project
cost.' 17 This increase was due to emphasis on ACT conditions in policy reform
projects. 118 The Report concludes that the increase in the ACT component did
not reduce corruption in the borrowing country, 119 and this is particularly true
among the poorest countries.' 20  The IEG Report bases its conclusion on the
comparison of corruption incidences between the PSR recipient countries and
non-PSR recipient countries and states that the finding that there was "small or
zero difference" implied "no significant improvement."' 2' Notwithstanding the
overall negative conclusion, the IEG Report concludes that the most successful
112 See CPI 2008, supra note 100, at 13 (explaining that the CPI 2007 ranks countries based on the
degree to which corruption is perceived to exist among public officials by drawing on polls and surveys
from independent institutions).
113 See id. at 16 (noting that the CPI 2008 is widely used by scholars, analysts and governments in
assessing aid).
114 INT'L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE ET AL., CLEAN BUSINESS is GOOD BUSINESS (Jul. 15, 2008), http://
www.iccwbo.org/uploadedFileslThe%20Business%2OCase%20Against%20Currption-l 9JuneO8.pdf
(noting that the cost of corruption equals more than 5% of global GDP (US $2.6 trillion)).
115 IEG Report, supra note 10.
116 Id. at 30.
117 Id.
118 Id. (stating that identifiable ACT components increased from 1.7 to 15.1 projects per year between
2000 and 2006).
119 lEG Report, supra note 10, at 60.
120 Id. The Report discusses that International Development Association (IDA) countries that bor-
rowed for PSR did little better than the IDA countries that did not borrow. Id. The Report further claims
that the difference in improvement between IDA and International Bank for Reconstruction and Develop-
ment (IBRD) countries is the largest theme in the evaluation. Id.
121 Id. (noting that because the results are based on rankings, the numbers will inherently change a
little even if nothing changes in the country's performance).
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methods for combating or controlling public sector corruption are indirect trans-
parency related requirements, such as publication requirements and freedom of
information laws. 122
The lEG Report distinguishes between (a) grand corruption (state capture) and
(b) petty corruption (bureaucratic). 123 Furthermore, it distinguishes between di-
rect and indirect approaches to corruption within each of the two categories. The
DIRECT means include anti-corruption commissions, public official's disclosure
of assets and the investigation and prosecution of sudden changes in government
officials' financial statuses. The INDIRECT means include publication and clarifi-
cation of laws, freedom and access to information and other transparency-related
measures. The EG Report finds that grand corruption or state capture has been
difficult to combat through either direct or indirect reforms. The Report does
state, however, that the indirect means to combat bureaucratic corruption have
been effective and that such progress could in the end also help with the problem
of grand corruption or state capture. 124
In 2008, Transparency International (TI) issued the 2007 Progress Report
(OECD Progress Report) on the OECD Convention that criminalized payment of
bribes to foreign public officials. 125 The Report finds that although all the signa-
tories have laws on the books that criminalize paying of bribes to foreign offi-
cials there has been very limited prosecution, if any, in many of the signatory
nations. The OECD Progress Report states that the system is facing a "stale-
mate" between those who have enforced the Convention and those who have not
and there is a growing role for India and China who are not bound by such a
Convention. The Report warns that "unless the laggards start enforcement with-
out further delay, there is danger of backsliding by those that are now enforcing."
The present stalemate is unsustainable; support for the Convention must be re-
energized or it will falter." 126 The IEG Report concludes that transparency re-
lated measures aimed at targeting bureaucratic corruption have been the most
effective way of combating corruption because they break the "culture of se-
crecy" that "pervades the government functioning and empower[s] people to de-
mand public accountability." 127
122 Id. at 62 (emphasizing that support for these measures has been the World Bank's most important
contribution to furthering the anti-corruption effort).
123 Id. at 58. Examples of grand corruption include: corrupt awards of big contracts; embezzlement of
public funds; and kickbacks from international corporations and privatization to insiders at bargain
prices. Id. at 59 tbl. 5.4. Examples of petty corruption include: bribery; skimming of paychecks; nepo-
tism in appointments; selective enforcement of taxes and the use of public facilities for private paying
clients. Id.
124 Id. at 63 (noting that direct measures rarely succeed because they often lack the important support
of political elites and the judicial system and reduction of bureaucratic corruption could move the broader
political discourse toward opposing grand corruption).
125 See OECD Report, supra note 11.
126 Id. at 8.
127 lEG Report, supra note 10, at 64.
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IIl. Conclusion
The failure of direct efforts to combat corruption shows that for the battle
against corruption to succeed there is a need to create a culture that respects
transparency and due process. The WTO, more than any other institution, is
capable of promoting the culture of transparency and due process. The incre-
mental manner in which the WTO panels and Appellate Body address the lack of
transparency and fundamental due process is more likely to reduce opportunities
for corrupt acts than setting up an anti-corruption agency as the World Bank has
done in Kenya.
It is the culture of secrecy and lack of information or access to information by
a population that allows corruption to take hold and increase. The WTO rules
prohibit secrecy and value transparency. The WTO, by providing a forum for a
discussion of such issues, allows Members to acknowledge certain core values of
good governance that are diametrically opposed to the culture of secrecy.
The problem of corruption has existed from the beginning of time and the
WTO can neither solve nor eradicate it. However, the WTO can and does play
an important role in promoting transparency and good governance. Over the past
few years, the potential of the WTO to enhance values that effectively curb cor-
ruption, such as transparency, has increased while, at the same time, other efforts
to combat corruption have failed or are likely to fail. Additionally, the rhetoric of
anti-corruption has lost some appeal given the actions of the World Bank and
others. It is advisable for the WTO to refrain from directly addressing the prob-
lem of corruption. The WTO can be most effective in combating corruption indi-
rectly through its many provisions that mandate transparency and due process in
the administration of all types of regulation.
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